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ers/competitors that appraise paintings and implement
trust models. Figure1shows an outline of the ART do-
main.
At each timestep, the simulator engine presents each
appraiser agent with paintings (generated by the sim-
ulation engine) to be appraised, paying a fi ed fee for
each appraisal request. Very close valuations of paint-
ings to the real value would lead to more future clients,
and therefore to more earnings to win the competition.
The coresponding steps of a turn in ART games is
shown in Fig.2.
Each painting belongs to an era from among a set of
artistic eras, while agents have diferent levels of ex-
pertise (ability to appraise) in each era. An agent can
appraise its own paintings and may request opinions (at
a fi ed cost) from other appraisers to get its valuation
of the painting close to the real value (specialy useful
in the eras where the agent has low expertise). An agent
can act also as provider of appraisals in response to
opinion (about paintings) requests from other agents.
Additionaly, an agent can similarly request reputation
information about other appraisers (at a fi ed and much
lower cost than opinions). The winner of an ART game
is the agent who earned more money over the number
of iterations that were run in the game. Such earnings
come from diferent sources: paintings appraised to the
own clients (Client Fee), paintings appraised to other
appraiser agents (Opinion Cost) and reputations shared
Fig. 2. Steps of a gameturn in ART domain. Source: [13].
with other appraiser agents (Reputation Cost), where
Client Fees are the main source of income since: Client
Fee Opinion Cost
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Reputation Cost. Trust mod-
els implemented in agents have to implement decisions
involved in these protocols (aggregating opinion and
reputation values, considering who to ask and answer,
weighting opinions, etc.).
In 2008, a new version of the testbed included the
possibility of expertise of agents about eras chang-
ing over time (expertise dynamicity). Every time step,

of 2006 ART competition (the parameter setup and the 
code of 2006 participants are public and therefore these 
experiments are repeatable8). The participants and the 
resulting earnings of such competition are also public.9
As the ART testbed in 2006 had an important lim-
itation of scalability, games could involve at most 5 
agents. Because of this scalability limitation of the 
2006 ART testbed the 13 participants were grouped 
in 14 different preliminary rounds, that leaded to a 
fina  game with the 5 agents implementing the best 
trust models in the preliminary rounds. Therefore we 
considered the application of our evolutionary-inspired 
games to these best 5 agents who played the fina  round 
in the 2006 competition. As we consider these partici-
pants (a single instance of each competitor) as the firs  
game in our evolutionary-inspired simulation, then the 
results become equal to those of the officia  ranking: 
IAM wins and sabatini loses. So second game includes 
2 IAM agents, no sabatini agent and the other 3 agents 
as participants of the second game. We proceed in same 
way including an extra winner agent and excluding the 
loser agent in consecutive games. Next we show in Ta-
ble 1 the agents that win and lose each consecutive 
game with the corresponding earnings. The earnings 
shown in Table 1 are computed in the same way as the 
competition, as a sum of all the bank balances, and 
game length and game repetition as define  in the same 
way (60 minutes maximum, 10 times) so all the exper-
iments shown here can be easily repeated.
Specificall  with this experiment we have shown 
that although the strategy of the winner of the 2006 in-
ternational competitions spreads in the firs  game (with 
2 agents implementing IAM trust model out of 5 par-
ticipant agents), it never becomes dominant (there is 
never a majority of iam agents). In fact it is defeated 
by other trust model, joey, which becomes totally dom-
inant (5 joey agents out of 5). Therefore IAM is not an 
evolutionarily stable trust model, so its superiority to 
the other agents is, at least, arguable. We also found
Table 1
Evolution simulation 2006 results
Game number Winner Earnings Loser Earnings
1 IAM 114,753 sabatini 90,699
2 joey 130,797 IAM 85,299
3 joey 128,388 frost 74,730
4 joey 135,390 neil 88,812
5 joey 126,573 IAM 90,192
out that the right equilibrium of trust models that forms 
an evolutionarily stable society is composed by 5 joey 
agents. Finally, from the order in which agents are ex-
cluded from the society, we can propose an alternative 
ranking of trust models in Table 2 which is slightly dif-
ferent from the competition ranking.
Since games in the 2006 version of ART testbed just 
involved 5 agents, we assume that conclusions of our 
evolutionary approach to trust comparisons would be 
more significan  in the 2007 and 2008 games, since 
5 agents is a small population. 2007 and 2008 compe-
titions had more diversity of agents in the games. But 
even with 5 agents we can see how the apparent best 
quality of IAM agent strongly depends on the oppo-
nents. On the other hand, the evolutionarily stable trust 
model, joey, is not able to win the initial game, but it 
wins and it avoids to be excluded in all the next games 
becoming totally dominant of the game.
3.3. Finding a ESS among 2007 ART competitors
Next, we have applied the same type of game to the 
participant agents of 2007 ART competition with the 
parameter setup and code of 2007 competition partici-
pants.10
In this case we consider as participants of the firs  
game of our evolutionary-inspired simulation a single 
instance of each competitor, without the dummy agents 
included in the competition games. The results of such 
firs  game become similar to those of the officia  rank-
ing: IAM2 wins and xerxes loses. So second game in-
cludes 2 IAM2 agents, no xerxes agent and the other 
14 agents as participants of the second game. Next we 
show in Table 3 the agents that win and lose each con-
secutive game with the corresponding earnings. The 
earnings shown in Table 3 are computed in same way 
as the competition, as a normalized bank balance (bank 
balance divided by number of timesteps in the game),
Table 2
Comparison of rankings of 2006 agents
Competition rank Evolution rank Agent name Excluded in
game number
2 1 joey –
1 2 iam 5
3 3 neil 4
4 4 frost 3
5 5 sabatini 1
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Table 3
Evolution simulation 2007 results
Game number Winner Earnings Loser Earnings
1 IAM2 17,377 xerxes −8610
2 IAM2 14,321 lesmes −13,700
3 IAM2 10,360 reneil −14,757
4 IAM2 10,447 blizzard −7093
5 agentevicente 8975 Rex −5495
6 IAM2 8512 alatriste −999
7 artgente 8994 agentevicente 2011
8 artgente 10,611 agentevicente 1322
9 artgente 8932 novel 424
10 IAM2 9017 IMM 1392
11 artgente 7715 marmota 1445
12 artgente 8722 spartan 2083
13 artgente 8966 zecariocales 1324
14 artgente 7285 IAM2 2599
15 artgente 7475 IAM2 2298
16 artgente 8384 UNO 2719
17 artgente 7639 IAM2 2878
18 IAM2 6279 JAM 3486
19 IAM2 14,674 artgente 2811
20 artgente 8035 IAM2 3395
and game length and game repetition define in the
same way (60 minutes maximum, 10 times) so all the
experiments shown here can be easily repeated. As it
was expected, since there are no dummies to easily
cheat, the earnings of agents are much lower than those
of the competition and the differences between winners
and losers becomes closer in the last games.
Specificall with this simulation, we have shown
that although the trust model of the winner of the 2007
international competition, IAM2, spreads in the soci-
ety of agents (until 6 agents implementing IAM2 trust
model out of 16 participant agents), it never becomes
dominant (there is never a majority of IAM2 agents).
In fact it is defeated by another trust model of artgente
agent, which becomes finall dominant (11 artgente
agents out of 16). Therefore IAM2 is not an evolution-
arily stable trust model, so its superiority as winner
of 2007 competition is, at least, relative. It seems that
IAM2 agent performs rather well when there is enough
diversity in the society, but, when it has to play against
clone agents implementing the same trust model, its
performance becomes heavily affected. On the other
hand, artgente agent shows no ability to win initial
games, but it avoids to be excluded in all the games
and when diversity of society is reduced it becomes an
almost unbeatable opponent of IAM2 agent. We also
found out that the right equilibrium of trust models that
Table 4
Comparison of rankings of 2007 agents
Competition rank Evolution rank Agent name Excluded in
game number
6 1 artgente –
1 2 IAM2 –
2 3 JAM 18
7 4 UNO 16
4 5 zecariocales 13
5 6 spartan 12
9 7 marmota 11
13 8 IMM 10
10 9 novel 9
15 10 agentevicente 8
11 11 alatriste 6
12 12 Rex 5
3 13 blizzard 4
8 14 reneil 3
14 15 lesmes 2
16 16 xerxes 1
form an evolutionarily stable society is composed by 
10–11 artgente agents and 6–5 IAM2 agents. Finally, 
from the order in which agents are excluded from the 
society, we can generate an alternative ranking of trust 
models in Table 4 which is very different from the 
competition ranking. Jointly with the alternative rank-
ing we can see the game number in which the corre-
sponding agents were excluded. From it, we can also 
comment that JAM agent lasts until game number 18, 
which is an excellent result. This shows that it is clearly 
better than other agents not present in the equilibrium 
society since JAM agent avoids exclusion 1 games 
(number 17) competing with a society of IAM2 and 
artgente agents. So we can remark that JAM agent has 
more relevance than just the 3rd place in the alternative 
ranking (in fact it was the 2nd best agent in the officia  
competition).
3.4. Finding a ESS among 2008 ART competitors
Finally we have applied this type of game to the par-
ticipant agents of the 2008 ART competition.11
We consider as participants of the firs  game in 
our evolutionary-inspired simulation a single instance 
of each competitor, without the dummy agents in-
cluded in the competition games. Again the results be-
come similar to those of the officia  ranking: uno2008 
wins and hailstorm loses. So second game includes
8
Table 5
Evolution simulation 2008 results
Game number Winner Earnings Loser Earnings
1 uno2008 2,690,281 hailstorm 1,012,622
2 uno2008 2,332,164 olpagent 964,783
3 uno2008 2,133,745 peles 944,896
4 uno2008 2,111,883 artgente2 1,609,998
5 uno2008 2,013,963 IAM 967,961
6 connected 1,840,376 mrroboto 1,340,291
7 uno2008 1,809,956 nextagent 1,344,296
8 uno2008 1,790,527 simplet 1,226,474
9 connected 1,683,182 uno2008 1,518,626
10 connected 1,743,356 uno2008 1,543,274
11 connected 1,710,364 fordprefect 1,440,956
12 connected 1,751,602 uno2008 1,499,951
13 connected 1,677,487 uno2008 1,516,218
14 connected 1,756,878 uno2008 1,397,317
15 uno2008 1,964,339 connected 1,372,826
2 uno2008 agents, no hailstorm agent and the other 9 
agents. Next we show in Table 5 the agents that win 
and lose each consecutive game with the corre-
sponding earnings. The earnings shown in Table 5 are 
computed in the same way than the competition, as 
a sum of all the bank balances, and game length and 
game repetition define  in the same way (90 iterations, 
3 times each with 0.05, 0.1 and 0.3 amount expertise 
change) so all the experiments shown here can be re-
peated.
As it was expected, since there are no dummies, 
the value of the earnings of the winning agent in the 
firs  game is lower than that of the competition, but 
they are in general very similar. We can also observe 
that the differences between winners and losers be-
come closer in the last games. From game 6, the dif-
ferences are halved, so we can conclude that there is 
a significan  gap between the agents excluded before 
such game number (IAM, artgente2, peles, olpagent 
and hailstorm) and the rest of them (uno2008, con-
nected, fordprefect, simplet, nextagent and mrroboto). 
This division into two groups is different according to 
the greatest difference in the earnings of agents in the 
competition results. There uno2008, connected, ford-
prefect and nextagent had much score than the rest of 
agents.
Equilibrium was reached in game 15 because con-
nected and uno2008 would next be continuously alter-
nating winners, and therefore 16th game would be an 
exact repetition of 14th game.
Specificall  with this experiment we have shown 
that although the strategy of the winner of the 2008
Table 6
Comparison of rankings of 2008 agents
Competition rank Evolution rank Agent name Excluded in
game number
2 1 connected –
1 2 uno2008 –
3 3 fordprefect 11
5 4 simplet 8
4 5 nextagent 7
6 6 mrroboto 6
8 7 iam 5
7 8 artgente2 4
9 9 peles 3
10 10 olpagent 2
11 11 hailstorm 1
international competition, uno2008, spreads in the so-
ciety of agents (until 7 agents implementing uno2008 
trust models out of 11 participant agents), even becom-
ing dominant (there is a majority of uno2008 agents), 
it is finall  defeated by other trust model (connected), 
which becomes dominant (8 connected agents out of 
11) in the fina  equilibrium (evolutionarily stable soci-
ety) form by 7–8 connected agents and 3–4 uno2008 
agents. Therefore uno2008 is not an evolutionarily sta-
ble trust model, so its superiority as winner of 2008 
competition is, at least, relative. It seems that uno2008 
agent performs rather well when there is enough diver-
sity in the society, but, when it has to play against clone 
agents implementing the same trust model, its perfor-
mance becomes heavily affected. On the other hand, 
connected agent shows no ability to win initial games, 
but it avoids to be excluded in all the games and when 
diversity of society is reduced it becomes a unbeatable 
opponent of uno2008 agent. Finally, from the order in 
which agents are excluded from the society, we can 
generate an alternative ranking of trust models in Ta-
ble 6 which is slightly different from the competition 
ranking. Jointly with the alternative ranking we can see 
the game number in which the corresponding agents 
were excluded.
We can also comment that other abilities of agents 
different from dominance can be observed using our 
evolutionary-inspired approach. For instance, fordpre-
fect agent lasts until game number 11, which it is an 
excellent result. This shows that it is clearly better than 
the other agents not present in the equilibrium society. 
Fordprefect agent avoids exclusion 2 games (number 9 
and 10) competing with a society of uno2008 and con-
nected agents. So we could also realize that fordprefect 
agent has more relevance than just the 3rd place in both 
(officia  and alternative) rankings.
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Table 7
Evolution simulation 2006 results with accumulative earnings
Game number Winner Earnings Loser Earnings
1 IAM 114,753 sabatini 90,699
2 joey 230,624 frost 184,135
3 joey 361,018 IAM 279,718
4 joey 485,884 neil 371,052
5 joey 610,736 IAM 461,174
Table 8
Evolution simulation 2007 results with accumulative earnings
Game number Winner Earnings Loser Earnings
1 IAM2 17,377 xerxes −8610
2 IAM2 31,698 lesmes −20,372
3 IAM2 42,058 reneil −23,013
4 IAM2 52,505 blizzard −16,089
5 IAM2 60,312 Rex −9470
6 IAM2 68,824 alatriste 780
7 IAM2 77,515 agentevicente 4530
8 artgente 88,126 novel 9093
9 artgente 97,058 IMM 13,601
10 artgente 106,075 marmota 18,347
11 artgente 113,790 zecarioles 25,642
12 artgente 122,512 spartan 37,918
13 artgente 131,478 UNO 57,032
14 artgente 138,763 JAM 69,856
15 artgente 146,238 IAM2 138,521
16 artgente 154,622 IAM2 145,082
17 artgente 162,261 IAM2 151,286
18 artgente 168,540 IAM2 158,931
19 IAM2 183,214 artgente 176,207
20 IAM2 191,249 artgente 185,320
3.5. Using accumulated instead of local earnings
In the previous games, winner was decided accord-
ing to the earnings obtained in each game, but we could 
alternatively consider the total earnings of each agent 
to decide winners according to the sum of the individ-
ual earnings of each evolutionary game. In that way a 
great advantage obtained in previous games can help 
an agent to avoid exclusion in future games. As you 
can see in Tables 7, 8 and 9, fina  equilibrium has not 
changed, but a few number of agents are excluded in 
different order. It seems that better agents are more dif-
ficul  to remove from earlier games than in the previ-
ous tables, but results do not change significat vely. We 
consider this alternative also as a reasonable way to 
compute our evolutionary approach for evaluating trust 
models with ART testbed.
Table 9
Evolution simulation 2008 results with accumulative earnings
Game number Winner Earnings Loser Earnings
1 uno2008 2,690,281 hailstorm 1,012,622
2 uno2008 5,022,445 olpagent 2,073,883
3 uno2008 7,156,190 peles 3,113,269
4 uno2008 9,268,073 artgente2 4,884,267
5 uno2008 11,282,036 IAM 5,949,024
6 uno2008 13,082,734 mrroboto 7,423,344
7 uno2008 14,892,690 nextagent 8,902,070
8 connected 16,528,034 simplet 10,251,191
9 connected 18,211,216 fordperfect 11,921,680
10 connected 19,954,572 uno2008 19,455,708
11 connected 21,664,936 uno2008 20,896,664
12 connected 23,416,538 uno2008 22,396,615
13 connected 25,094,025 uno2008 23,912,833
14 connected 26,850,903 uno2008 25,310,150
15 uno2008 28,795,242 connected 28,075,361
4. Conclusions
Due to the relative success of the trust and reputa-
tion research, a good design foundation of fair com-
parisons among trust models will spread the inclusion
of reputation and trust communications into more gen-
eral service-oriented systems that would be truly dis-
tributed. According to this intention, we have define
what an evolutionarily stable strategy would be in trust
domain, and how it can be shown through a repeated
game with a simulation of evolution.
We have applied such game definitio to the partici-
pant agents of 2006, 2007 and 2008 ART competitions
and we found out relevant differences with the officia
ranking. For instance the winners of 2007 and 2008
competition were not implementing an evolutionarily
stable strategy. It seems that both IAM2 and uno2008
agents perform rather well when there is enough diver-
sity in the society, but when they have to face clone
agents implementing the same trust model their per-
formance becomes heavily affected. Additionally some
other minor conclusions were outlined such as: the re-
markably long life of fordprefect agent in 2008 and
JAM agent in 2007, the very different ranking of 2007
and the unexpected relevant gap between two groups
of agents in 2008. Therefore, the application of evolu-
tionary game theory in ART competitions shows that
this evaluation method for trust models is not redun-
dant, it provides new information valuable to compare
the quality of trust models. In this way, we have shown
that quality of trust models cannot be determined com-
pletely with games based on direct competitions of an
instance of each agent per game. More information
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could be obtained to determine the best trust model
with other different types of games. Therefore, perfor-
mance of agents depends on the opponents they face in
games and on the particular game setup. In this way,
new game setups have to be define to evaluate perfor-
mance of agents facing very different situations.
In our simulation we decided to apply a low fre-
quency of changes of trust model (just the agent who
lost the game may change of trust model) since there
was a low number of participants in ART competitions.
Therefore we reach an equilibrium in a small num-
ber of games. Other higher frequencies could be ap-
plied (particularly in simulations with very large pop-
ulations of agents). Furthermore other different game
conditions could fir the change of trust model, for in-
stance, a very big difference between the loser and the
winner after a given number of game iterations (avoid-
ing changes in the case of even games). But if the pos-
sibility of changing trust model was unlimited (a very
high frequency of changes), then the agents’ ability of
becoming dominant would lose part of its desirability.
Regarding the results, the only big differences ap-
pear in the 2007 competition, while in 2006 and 2008
there are minimal differences. So it would be interest-
ing (but not easy to do) to implement a deeper anal-
ysis on the differences between 2006, 2007 and 2008
competitions, since the competitors cannot be run in
the testbed of another year. So we have to consider the
possibility that the differences between officia ART
ranking and the evolutionary ranking might also be in
the 2007 testbed design.
As a conclusion we stated that this kind of repeated
game has to be taken into account in the evaluation of
trust models, since new knowledge on the quality and
abilities of trust models can be concluded from them.
We do not claim that our evaluation method would be
fairer or more efficient Our approach is just another
way to compare them. It is not better or worst than oth-
ers, it is complementary. Any additional way to com-
pare them provides more or less weight to the decision
of adopting one instead the others. Specificall , our
method is focused on how much advantage an agent
loses when its trust model is replicated by other agents.
The application of our proposal would increase the
information about the quality of trust models, and then
it is a valuable contribution to Trust in Agent Soci-
eties literature. It is still open the problem of integrat-
ing this new information about the ability of becoming
dominant with the classic direct comparison of games
composed by one instance of each trust model. None
of them is better than the other, and considering an
average or weighted sum of rankings seems to have
not enough justification Since they measure the abil-
ity of trust models facing two different type of games,
weights would depend on the type of games we expect
these trust models to face in real world.
However, our approach is very focused on ART
testbed, and therefore our approach accepts its assump-
tions (decided after an open discussion in AAMAS
conferences) and our conclusions inherit its limita-
tions, overall two of them: the low number of trust
models involved in the games, which affects to trust
and evolutionary justification of use; and the use of
shared utility functions, which generally had to be, in a
more realistic approach, different for each agent. These
are the ART-derived problems to generalize our con-
clusions. In spite of this ART-dependence of our work,
we have to remark that although the ART competitors
implemented their trust models in an ad hoc way to win
ART competition with the previously established win-
ning conditions, our evolutionary competition is run
with ART rules, and each run was executed as ART
competition did. So the only change included by us,
is what the other competitors are, which was unknown
for everyone before the games, also in ART compe-
tition. So, they had to be designed to beat any other
trust model, including those which were very similar
to them (or even equal to them as we do in our evolu-
tionary computation).
We state that future work in the trust community
would be not just thinking about the testbed design im-
provements, but also about the games definitio and
evaluation metrics. This consideration is not specifi
to ART testbed issues. Evolutionarily-inspired games
have to be considered in any comparison of trust mod-
els. It is a metric that provides additional knowledge
about the different abilities/quality of trust models and
it can be applied in any of the simulations of agent so-
cieties that have been proposed until now for compar-
ing trust models.
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